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Wage Subsidies for Microenterprises 
Suresh de Mel, David McK enzie and Christopher Woodruff 
 
Wage subsidies have long been used by Governments as part of their active labor market policies 
to generate employment for the disadvantaged or to sustain employment during downturns. The 
current global financial crisis has seen such policies return to prominence, with many developed 
nations using such policies to try and reduce lay-offs. Nicholas Kaldor (1936), P. Richard Layard 
and Stephen Nickell (1980), and Lawrence Katz (1998) lay out the economic arguments for such 
a policy, and discuss conditions under which a short-term subsidy might have longer-term effects 
on employment for the targeted individuals. 
 
One of the arguments made for short-term wage subsidies to disadvantaged groups like the long-
term unemployed, ethnic minorities, or youth, is that short-term employment can raise the 
productivity of this group through their experience of work (Brian Bell, Richard Blundell, and 
John van Reenen, 1999), and that the subsidies can compensate employers for the risks of taking 
a chance in hiring such workers (World Bank, 2006). 
 
In the context of developing economy labor markets where half or more of the labor force is 
employed in enterprises with fewer than 5 employees, similar motivations can be given for 
making short-term wage subsidies to microenterprise owners to encourage them to make the leap 
to hiring workers. Owners of microenterprises may be uncertain about their own abilities to hire 
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workers, uncertain about whether the demand for their output can support an additional worker, 
or credit constrained and unable to pay for the costs of the initial on-the-job training needed to 
make workers productive. (Poverty constraints and social norms may limit the ability of workers 
to take low initial wages to compensate for their low initial productivity). If any of these 
conditions hold, workers might go unhired even when the marginal productivity of an additional 
unit of labor in microenterprises is higher than the market wage. In this short paper we describe 
the implementation and take-up of a randomized experiment in Sri Lanka motivated by these 
ideas. It is, to our knowledge, the first program to offer wage subsidies to microenterprises, and 
in the future RIIHUV WKH SRVVLELOLW\ RI PHDVXULQJ WKH PDUJLQDO UHWXUQ WR ODERU WKURXJK ³ODERU
GURSV´, analogous to our SUHYLRXVZRUNZLWK³FDSLWDOGURSV´which has found very high returns 
to capital in Sri Lankan microenterprises (de Mel, McKenzie and Woodruff, 2008). 
 
I .  T H E E XPE RI M E N T 
Between March and October 2008, we conducted a door-by-door listing exercise of households 
in 18 randomly selected neighborhoods of greater Colombo and surroundings, greater Kandy, 
Galle and Matara, in order to obtain a representative sample of microenterprises. Through this 
exercise we obtained a sample of 1,534 male-owned microenterprises with fewer than 2 paid 
employees, of which 845 were randomly selected to be offered a wage subsidy for hiring an 
employee. In this paper, we focus on the sample of enterprises offered the wage subsidy. 
 
The sample is dominated by owners with no paid or unpaid workers ± only 10.7 percent of the 
sample had a paid worker at baseline, 13.1 percent had an unpaid worker, and 78 percent of firms 
have neither. Firms are mostly in retail (62 percent) and manufacturing (28 percent), covering a 
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broad range of sectors typical for the self-employed in developing countries. Examples include 
grocery stores, fruit stands, tea boutiques, tailors, carpenters, jewelry work, bicycle repair shops, 
barbers, shoemakers, and other such small-scale operations. The median owner is 36 years old, 
has 11 years of education, has been operating the business for 6 years, and reports earnings of 
11,000 Rupees (approximately $US100) per month in business profits. 31 percent of the 
businesses were formally registered with the division secretariat. 
 
In July 2009 these microenterprise owners were visited with a letter from the research project 
office (signed by the local university-affiliated co-author), explaining the wage subsidy offer. 
The subsidy would be available from August 1, 2009, and was set at a level of 4,000 Rupees per 
month for the first six months for a full-time (30 or more hours per week) worker, and at 2,000 
Rupees per month for two months after that. The six-month rate was set to be approximately a 50 
percent subsidy on the cost of hiring a typical low-wage worker. The subsidy would be paid to 
the employer, and could be used to hire any new worker aged 16 to 65, provided that they did not 
live in the same household as the microenterprise owner, and were not the child or parent of the 
owner. Owners could delay in taking up the subsidy, but were told that the program would end in 
May 2010, so that they would get the program for less time if they started after October 1, 2009. 
This offer was also explained in person by the visiting research assistant, and the owners were 
provided with a phone number and office location they could visit to ask questions about the 
program. Before the offer was made, a list of current employees and household family members 
was taken to ensure that these groups were not subsequently presented as the new worker.  
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Emanuela Galasso, Martin Ravallion and Agustin Salvia (2004) found low take-up among 
employers of a wage-subsidy program in Argentina because of a requirement that workers be 
formally registered for social security charges. The vast majority of microenterprises and small 
firms in Sri Lanka do not register their workers, and so we did not make legal registration of the 
workers a requirement of the program. This has the advantage of ensuring relevance of the 
program to the very types of firms that might be reluctant to take a chance on transitioning to 
employer status. However, the disadvantage is that it is more difficult to verify in an informal 
firm, without firm or government employment records, that a genuine worker has been hired, and 
that this worker actually works the hours stated, than would be the case in larger formal firms. 
We therefore (a) required that we meet and interview the employee before making any payment; 
(b) conducted spot checks in person, over the phone, and with neighboring businesses to verify 
that the employee was actually working; and (c) had a formal warning system so that firms 
where the worker could not be found at the business would receive a warning and then not get 
paid in that month if subsequent checks did not find the worker working at the business. 
 
I I . W H I C H M I C R O E N T E RPRISES T A K E-UP W A G E SUBSIDI ES 
The treatment was actually offered to 803 of the 845 microenterprises ± 27 of the firms had 
closed since the baseline survey and in the remaining cases the business owner could not be 
found to give them the offer. Between August 1 and  November 13, 179 of the firms (22 percent 
of those offered) have taken-up the program. We use our baseline data to investigate what 
characteristics of firms and owners predict take-up. 
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Table 1 presents marginal effects from probit regressions of take-up among the firm owners 
actually offered the treatment, estimated for the 772 of the 803 firms offered the treatment for 
which we have full non-missing data. Column 1 considers firm characteristics, column 2 
characteristics of the owner, and column 3 combines the two. Column 4 then adds an indicator of 
whether they answered yes to a hypothetical question posed in 200³Would you hire an additional 
worker for your business if someone else were to pay one third of the wage cost during the first year?´,  
 
Table 1: Determinants of Take-up of a Microenterprise Wage Subsidy 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Colombo -­‐0.127*** -­‐0.0969** -­‐0.104**
(0.0454) (0.0464) (0.0464)
Firm  had  a  paid  worker 0.0335 0.0195 0.0163
(0.0509) (0.0484) (0.0480)
Firm  had  an  unpaid  worker 0.0819* 0.0737 0.0693
(0.0488) (0.0487) (0.0489)
Firm  had  above  median  assets 0.0680** 0.0465 0.0458
(0.0316) (0.0313) (0.0312)
Education  of  owner  (years) 0.0146** 0.00913 0.00960
(0.00711) (0.00730) (0.00720)
Business  practices:  2nd  quartile 0.0801* 0.0627 0.0657
(0.0473) (0.0475) (0.0476)
Business  practices:  3rd  quartile 0.114** 0.0750 0.0755
(0.0539) (0.0536) (0.0536)
Business  practices:  Top  quartile 0.202*** 0.146*** 0.139**
(0.0526) (0.0560) (0.0558)
Says  would  hire  additional  worker 0.0645**
(0.0306)
Number  of  Observations 772 772 772 772  
Notes: 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significantly different from zero at the 10, 5 and 1 
percent levels respectively.  Dependent variable mean is 0.22. 
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See text for descULSWLRQRI ³EXVLQHVVSUDFWLFHV´YDULDEOHAll specifications also include a control for whether the 
baseline survey was taken in April 2008 or October 2008. Also included, but statistically insignificant are dummies 
for retail and manufacturing, Kandy district, age of firm, and legal registration status as firm characteristics, and the 
RZQHU¶VDge, trust, discount rate, and risk-seeking score as owner characteristics. 
 
We see much lower uptake in Colombo than in other cities, even conditional on firm and owner 
attributes. This may be due to higher wage rates in Colombo²so a given flat rate subsidy is a 
lower percentage of the market wage²or to greater fears of having to register workers with the 
labor ministry in the capital city, or to other reasons. Take-up does not vary significantly with 
firm sector, firm age, or whether the firm is legally registered. We do find some evidence of 
higher take-up for firms which already had unpaid workers, and for firms with higher than 
median assets. This is consistent with the idea that it is slightly bigger firms with more capital 
who are ready to take the step-up to becoming an employer. 
 
Turning to owner characteristics, we see more able business owners are more likely to hire a 
worker when offered the wage subsidy. We measure a set of business practices utilized by the 
business owner, such as record-keeping and planning, marketing techniques, inventory control, 
and costing. These practices are the intended outcomes of the International Labor Organization¶V
Improve Your Business training program, and so we take more extensive use of these practices 
as a marker of better business skills. We form quartiles of the total number of practices 
implemented by the owner, and see that microenterprise owners in the top quartile are 14.6 
percentage points more likely to employ a worker under the wage subsidy program than someone 
in the bottom quartile of business practices. Take-up is also higher for owners with more formal 
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years of schooling. There is no significant effect of owner age, nor does take-up vary with 
preference parameters such as risk aversion, the discount rate, or trust in others.  
 
Finally, Column 4 shows that firm owners who said they would hire a worker in a hypothetical 
question before the program was announced are more likely to take up the program 5-6 months 
later, even conditional on measureable firm and owner characteristics. This suggests that hiring a 
worker is not just a spur of the moment decision, but an attitude which exhibits persistence. It 
also suggests that such hypothetical questions may be useful in gauging demand for such 
subsidies. 
 
I I I . W H O IS H IR E D UND E R SU C H A PR O G R A M? 
We interviewed both the employer and the employee to collect information on how the employer 
found a worker to hire, the characteristics of the workers hired, the wage paid, and the 
expectations of the employer and the worker as to how long this employment would last. We 
summarize here these responses. 
 
Employers relied heavily on personal connections to locate a new worker. Less than 2 percent 
placed any sort of advertisement at the enterprise or another location to openly advertise the 
position. The most common methods through which a worker was hired were through the 
business owner asking friends (36 percent), neighbors (22 percent), or family members (22 
percent) for suggestions. In 28 percent of the cases the employer was related to the worker, 
although in over half of such cases the relationship was a distant one, such as second cousin. In 
20 percent of cases, the worker had actually worked for the owner previously, typically as a 
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casual worker during a peak season. In some cases, the worker had left because of a fall in sales 
RUEHFDXVHWKH\KDGIRXQGDQRWKHUMRE,WZDVUDUHWRKLUHVRPHRQHWKHHPSOR\HUKDGQ¶WDOUHDG\
met ± only 15 percent of workers were individuals that the owner did not already know. 
 
The most important qualities that employers said they looked for in choosing the worker were 
gender²rated as very important by 70 percent of owners² that the worker was someone known 
to them²rated as very important by 57 percent²and their previous job experience²rated as 
very important by 41 percent. The majority of employers said the educational qualifications of 
the worker were unimportant, and that age was only somewhat important.  
 
While all the owners were male, 23 percent of the workers hired were female. One-third of the 
workers were aged 16 to 24 years, and 13 percent aged 50 or older; the median age was 30. Half 
of the male workers and half the female workers were married. The median and modal education 
level of the workers was 11 years (O-levels), the same as the median education level of the 
employers. Before taking the job many of the employees were in other work: 26 percent were 
employees in another firm, 25 percent self-employed, 8 percent were casual workers or day 
laborers, and 3 percent apprentices. In comparison, 33 percent were unemployed, 4 percent were 
students, and 1 percent were retired. Few of these unemployed individuals had applied for other 
jobs in the past year, suggesting the wage subsidy is pulling some individuals into the workforce 
who would otherwise not be working. 
 
The mean (median) weekly wage paid to workers hired with this wage subsidy was 2,117 Rupees 
(1,750 Rupees). Recall that the monthly wage subsidy is 4,000 Rupees. One-quarter of firms 
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report hiring a worker at or below 1,000 Rupees per week, meaning that the subsidy covered the 
full wage.1 The median share of the wage covered by the wage subsidy was 57 percent, which is 
close to our target of covering 50 percent of the wage cost. The results of the experiment show 
that there is tremendous heterogeneity in the wages offered by microenterprises in hiring 
employees ± the 10th percentile of wages of 750 Rupees per week is less than one-fifth of the 
4000 Rupee per week offered at the 90th percentile.  
 
Given this heterogeneity, one could consider instead subsidizing a fraction of the wage bill. 
However, this would require even more effort in monitoring, as employers would then have 
incentives to overstate wages, hours or both. Instead, if the concern is that a flat rate subsidy may 
bias firms towards creating low-skilled employment opportunities only, governments considering 
such a program could set different subsidies according to observable and verifiable 
characteristics of the firms and occupations that are associated with them paying higher wages.   
 
I V . C O N C L USI O NS 
A wage subsidy equivalent to approximately half the cost of hiring a low-skilled worker induced 
22 percent of eligible microenterprise owners to hire a worker. Among those hiring workers, 64 
percent of the owners say this is the first paid employee they have ever hired; 86 percent tell us 
they expect to continue to employ the worker after the subsidy is removed. The median 
enterprise expects sales to increase by 25 percent as a result of hiring the employee, If these 
expectations are borne out, they suggest that a short term wage subsidy could have long-term 
                                                 
1  We asked both employees and employers for weekly wages. The data are very highly correlated (0.84) and match 
exactly just over half the time. But the correlation in responses is much lower (.16) when the employer reports 
wages of 1000 Rupees per week or less. So the subsidy may not exceed the wage even in some of the cases where 
the employer data suggest that it does.  
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effects on enterprise size. Our ongoing work will follow these firms and compare their 
employment, sales, and profits to a control group. It will also try and understand why more firms 
do not hire workers, when it seems that a number of firms were able to obtain workers for free 
under our program. 
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